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Letter from the Chair
This is my first letter as the new Chair of the
MSB Studies Group as I take over the leadership
from Eric Thompson, who served a three-year
term characterized by hard work and a devotion
to increase the visibility and maintain the
credibility of our organization. He remains as
Chair ex-officio and will continue keep MSB on
strong footing as we seek to build and grow our
group to include members from around the
world who work on and think about this key
region of insular Southeast Asia.
At our annual meeting, which always takes place
at the Association of Asian Studies conference,
we thanked Eric for his wonderful service, and
voted to elect Cheong Gan Soon as the Deputy
Chair and Chair-Elect. We were delighted that
Dominik Müller agreed to take over the
editorship of BERITA, and this issue reflects his
effort to producing the Summer 2018 issue right
on schedule. Dominik, Cheong Soon, and I are
committed to making BERITA a publication
that truly matters to our members and serves
their interests. Along with our Google Group,
“msbforum,” (which you can join by emailing me
at msbchair@gmail.com); our very active and
informative Facebook group (which you can
request to join at “Official Malaysia, Singapore,
Brunei Studies Group [MSB]”); and our annual
meeting, we communicate with and across a very
wide and growing group of people who share our
interests. But BERITA, (formerly and for
decades appearing in print form) has always been
the mainstay and foundation of our efforts.

State Library), you’ll learn what mattered to
readers then. It has an interview with
anthropologist Ronald Provencher, who served
as Chair of MSB for many years and an editor of
BERITA. A list of new books published appears:
among them several worth another look in the
current moment—Francis Loh Kok and Khoo
Boo Teik’s Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and
Practices, Edmund Terence Gomez’s Chinese
Business in Malaysia, and Peter Searles’ The
Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers or
Real Capitalists? Articles discuss Vincent Tan’s
lawsuit against Jomo K.S. (claiming defamation
from Jomo’s op-ed in the Asian Wall Street
Journal—“Malaysia
Props
Up
Crony
Capitalists”)—and the dismissal of Chandra
Muzaffar from Universiti Malaya. Those were
turbulent and interesting times in Malaysia; they
remain so, and we want BERITA to be a place
where you learn much about them. We urge all
of our members and readers to consider
submitting material to the next issue of BERITA
and any that follow. Please send us articles on
your research, publications, and calls for papers
and conferences, and use BERITA as a place to
highlight your work and writing. We would
especially like to spotlight the work of young
scholars, report on recently published works,
provide short reports about MSB-related events,
and publish interviews with people in our field. I
hope you enjoy this current issue.
Patricia Sloane-White, MSB Group Chair
Department of Women and Gender Studies
University of Delaware, USA
pswhite@udel.edu

If you look at the BERITA summer 1998 issue,
published exactly twenty years ago (you can find
twenty years of BERITA linked to our Facebook
page and the earlier issues online at the Ohio
Summer 2018
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Announcements
Application for MSB Panel Sponsorship:
The Malaysia-Singapore-Brunei Studies Group
sponsors one panel per year at the annual
conference of the Association for Asian Studies.
Members interested in panel sponsorship by the
MSB are asked to submit the full panel and paper
abstracts to the MSB Chair (pswhite@udel.edu)
at least one week before the AAS Submission
deadline, which is August 1, 2018 for the March
21-24, 2019 conference in Denver, Colorado.
Sponsorship indicates a level of pre-vetting and
assurance of the session’s quality and importance
by the sponsoring group or institution, which is
taken into consideration by the AAS Program
Committee during the review process. eration by
the AAS Program Committee during the review
process. Please note, sponsored sessions are not
guaranteed acceptance and must undergo
normal competitive review. The listing of a
sponsor for the submitted proposal is taken into
consideration by the Program Committee during
the review process, but is not a guarantee of
acceptance. If you would like your panel to be
sponsored by the MSB Study Group, please
mark the box on the proposal form indicating
sponsorship—i.e., as if your MSB sponsorship
were already confirmed. We will review all
submissions and determine if sponsorship is to
be granted.

Prizes
John A. Lent Prize 2018
Prof. John A. Lent founded BERITA in 1975,
editing it for twenty-six years, and founded the

Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group in
1976, serving as chair for eight years. He has been a
university faculty member since 1960, in Malaysia,
the Philippines, China, and various U.S. universities.
From 1972-74, Prof. Lent was founding director of
Malaysia's first university-level mass communications program at Universiti Sains Malaysia. He
has been a professor at Temple University since 1974.
Over the years, Prof. Lent has written monographs
and many articles on Malaysian mass media,
animation, and cartooning. He is the author and
editor of seventy-one books and monographs, and
hundreds of articles and book chapters. Since 1994, he
has chaired the Asian Cinema Society and has been
the editor of the journal Asian Cinema. He publishes
and edits the International Journal of Comic Art,
which he started in 1999, and is chair of the Asian
Research Center on Animation and Comic Art and
Asian-Pacific Association of Comic Art, both of
which he established.
John A. Lent Prize Commendation
The 2018 John A. Lent prize is awarded to the
best paper with Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei
content presented at the previous year’s (2017)
Association for Asian Studies conference. After
careful consideration of the papers submitted for
the prize, the Committee for the John A. Lent
Prize for the best paper on Malaysia, Singapore,
and Brunei presented to the AAS in the previous
year has chosen as its winner Dominik M.
Müller, for his paper “The Bureaucratization of
Islam and its Socio-Legal Dimensions in
Southeast Asia: Ethnographic Observations
from Brunei Darussalam and their Implications
for Conceptualizing a Larger Comparative
Framework.” The three committee members all
agreed that Müller’s paper deserves special
recognition for its compelling and original focus
and the high quality of its analysis.
Summer 2018
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All of the submitted papers this year were
meticulously crafted, with strong theoretical
bases. But Müller, in particular, has brought
many theoretical lenses to play, which lends the
reader multiple entry points into his analysis. He
argues, convincingly, that the bureaucratization
of Islam “is not simply synonymous” with its
“institutionalization, but …constitutes a wider
socio-legal phenomenon that far transcends its
institutional boundaries” as it “deeply
penetrate(s) into public discourse and everyday
life.” Choosing Brunei—a woefully understudied
region in our organization and beyond—and
offering a detailed understanding of the
mechanics and structure of its Islamic state is in
itself of great value, but Müller makes it clear
that Brunei is a key site and “ideal type” for
studying and conceptualizing the bureaucratization of religion. It is, however, his ambitious
proposal for a broad intraregional, transnational,
and collaborative research project on the
bureaucratization of religion that is the highlight
of his paper, and he has more than adequately
made the case not just for filling a gap in the
literature, but the worth of the analysis. What is
equally tantalizing is his aim to create an
epistemic partnership with his subjects—a
crucial and overdue turn in the anthropology of
power and bureaucracy. Müller’s own data on
Brunei is intriguing, though by no means yet
complete, and he recognizes that so much more
work needs to be done for the ambitious
theoretical framework to be sustainable. Finally,
Müller’s paper shows strong awareness for the
impact circulations of power bring to bear on
ethnographic studies and builds an excellent case
for conceptualizing bureaucratization of Islamic
religious authority not only in the Brunei,
Malaysia, and Singapore region but anywhere
governments and institutions produce and

exercise “the micro-politics of bureaucratic
meaning-making and knowledge production.”
The Committee for the John A. Lent Prize
congratulates Dominik Müller for this
outstanding and compelling contribution to our
knowledge.
Prize Committee Members: Eric C.
Thompson, Cheong Soon Gan, and Jamie
Davidson.

Ronald Provencher Travel Grant
The Ronald Provencher Travel Grant is named in
honor of Ronald Provencher, distinguished cultural
anthropologist of Malaysia, a long-time leader of the
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group and
former editor of BERITA. It carries with it a
US$750 award for a graduate student, postdoctoral
fellow, or independent scholar from Malaysia,
Singapore or Brunei to travel to present a paper at the
Association for Asian Studies meeting.
The 2018 Ronald Provencher Travel Grant was
awarded to Helena Binti Muhamad Varkkey,
Senior Lecturer, Department of International
and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya.
Throughout her academic career, she has been
working on themes related to sustainable
development. Her interest in the field has
evolved to a focus on transboundary pollution in
Southeast Asia, particularly pertaining to the
role of patronage in agribusiness, especially the
palm oil industry and its links to forest fires and
haze in the region. At the 2018 AAS Conference,
Helena Varkkey presented a paper entitled
“Transboundary Haze as a Human Health Issue
in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and Member State
Responses,” at a panel sponsored by the AAS
Summer 2018
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Southeast Asia Council (SEAC) and TRaNS
Journal, entitled “Airs, Waters, Places and the
Peoples Who Use and Abuse All of Them in
Southeast Asia.”
Abstract:
“Haze has been a serious transboundary problem
in Southeast Asia for decades. Originating
largely from fires in Indonesia, the smoke travels
across borders affecting up to six Southeast
Asian states almost annually. Haze contains fine
particles which irritate the eyes and penetrate
the lungs. As a result, scores of Indonesians,
Malaysians, and Singaporeans suffer from
respiratory, dermatological, and ophthalmological problems. These health risks, together
with reduced visibility, have also caused tourist
numbers to drop dramatically. This chapter
observes that governments worked hard to
protect and maintain their tourism sectors in the
face of the haze. The main tactic used was
to underrepresent the health risks of haze, both
to citizens and tourists. As a result, regional
governments largely failed to recognize the haze
as a serious public health issue. At the national
level, states often under-report health effects in
the attempt to keep tourism levels stable. At the
regional level, member states have yet to agree
on a common ASEAN-wide regional air quality
measurement system, with many continuing to
use a system that tends to underrepresent health
risks. At the international level, affected states
have been quick to debunk research that
indicates higher levels of mortality. As a result,
citizens lacked the awareness and urgency to
make wise health and well-being decisions
during haze episodes. Sustainable development
involves economic growth balanced with social
development and environmental sustainability.
However, the case of the haze shows that
Southeast Asian states still find it challenging to

balance these elements in the spirit of sustainable
development.”
The full article will be published in an edited
volume, Sustainable Development; Asia-Pacific
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, ed.
Pak Sum Low, forthcoming 2018/9).

Summer 2018
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Panel Report
MSB Sponsored Panel
Food, Belonging and Identity in Colonial and
Post-Colonial Malaysia/Singapore – A Panel
Report
Patricia Sloane-White
This panel received the official sponsorship of
the Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group,
at the Association of Asian Studies, Annual
Conference, Saturday, March 25, Washington,
DC.
Chair and discussant: Patricia Sloane-White,
University of Delaware.
Presenters:
Cheong Soon Gan, University of WisconsinSuperior
Chee-Kien Lai, Singapore University of
Technology and Design, Singapore
Mareike Pampus, Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology
The panel examined the constant creation and
re-creation of Malayan, Malaysian, and
Singaporean identities against the backdrop of
ever-fluid regional and global encounters
through the lens of food culture. The
methodologically-varied papers had roots in
history, architecture, and anthropology, spanned
the late-19th century to the present, and explored
how various communities negotiated personal
and group identities as well as questions of
belonging as they transitioned from visitors,
migrants and sojourners to residents and
citizens. They addressed how, from Furnivall’s

plural society to national communities, food
became the nexus in which identity was created,
defined, expressed, re-created, re-defined, gazed
upon and discursively controlled in Malaya,
Malaysia, and Singapore.
Cheong Soon Gan’s (University of WisconsinSuperior) “Food, Cultural Identity, and the
Western Gaze in late 19th-century Malaya,”
explored the Western gaze on various Malayan
communities’ food culture in the middle to late
19th century as Malaya was evolving into a
multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with a
mixed economy of global cash crops and
traditional occupations. The contact between
various Malayan
communities, initially
conceptualized as limited in J.S. Furnivall’s
plural society, but increasingly re-examined in
newer scholarship (such as Su Lin Lewis’ study
on urban cosmopolitanism, Cities in motion),
occurred mainly within the realm of the
unrecorded, everyday lived experiences, unless
captured by the Western gaze. Reflecting on the
writings of Isabella Bird, Emily Innes and
Harriette McDougall published in the 1880s,
Gan demonstrated how the intersection of food
and identity was expressed, understood and
conceptualized by both the participants and
observers. Their observations on the consumption of food, the preparation of meals, the social
and cultural context of eating and drinking, and
the various communities’ relationship with their
environment reveal a lively food culture that was
the vanguard in cracking the plural society
barriers among Malayan communities, forcing
them to confront questions of identity while coexisting in a rapidly changing cultural, social,
and economic milieu.
Chee-Kien Lai (Singapore University of
Technology and Design, Singapore) delivered
Summer 2018
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“Tropical Fruits and Overseas Chinese Identity
in Singapore,” and reflected on research on the
“exotic” fruits (such as the mango, jackfruit,
mangosteen, papaya, Chinese fig, coconut,
pineapple, duku, langsat, breadfruit, soursop,
durian, and rambutan) discussed by overseas
Chinese contributors to the Journal of the South
Seas Society, published from the 1940s in
Singapore. The heightened awareness of such
fruits also permeated into the quotidian life of the
overseas Chinese. The paper described the
important role of fruits in transferring overseas
Chinese identity from that of sojourner to
potential resident. The ingestion of local fruits
not only helped in adapting these migrants to
their haptic consumption of local food, but also,
the availability of these fruits only seasonally
throughout the year assisted in their
synchronizing or calibrating of tropical time to
their own existential time. Lai demonstrated
how the fruits themselves became assimilated
forms of imagining and understanding of
traditions, identities, and community in the
“overseas Chinese” in Southeast Asia.
Mareike Pampus (Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany) delivered
“Chicken Kapitan: The Manifestation of
Connectivity in Nyonya Cooking,” an
anthropological exploration of how one Nyonya
dish, Chicken Kapitan, demonstrates how the
movements of tastes, ingredients and eating
habits play a significant role, particularly in
highly diverse places like port cities. Using the
notion of “connectivity”—the merging of local
and global influences and the movement of
people, goods, and techniques—Pampus showed
how socio-cultural adaptation took place among
the Nyonya cooks of Penang to demonstrate that
identities were shaped through and with food.
Penang Nyonya cooking emerged as something

original and highly localized, neither a product
of a homeland or a nation state, but one that was
unique to this port city, its colonial past and its
culturally mixed groups.
In her comment, Patricia Sloane-White
(University of Delaware) noted that the three
papers asked the audience to see globalization
not as merely a destructive force, but as a long
historical and cultural movement of people and
things that produced innovative, novel, and
hybrid forms of identity. The authors pointed to
how food, fruit, and cooking provide us with a
way to move beyond merely theorizing about
global connections to actually clarifying, in
specific moments and places, precisely how those
interactions occurred in empire, diasporas, and
port cities, producing, in effect, literally “recipes”
for hybridity. Cheong Soon Gan’s paper
provided a view into the wet markets and the
kitchens of colonial interactions as they became
“trans-cultural” and “incorporative.” Chee Kien
Lai’s paper provided not just a theory of
hybridization but insight into the actual
hybridization of culture through botanical
expertise as the overseas Chinese experimented
with growing fruits that reminded them of home.
And Mareike Pampus’ paper figuratively entered
the cooking pot—and the Penang melting pot—
where cultural symbols and food are both
“chosen and recomposed” as Nyonya cooking.
All three papers pointed out that to understand
how hybrid and interconnected identities were
constructed in Malaya, Malaysia, and Singapore
we must look closely at materiality, at the
admixture of actual things—on the ground, in the
vegetable gardens, in the markets, in the cooking
pots, and in the orchards—to see how
globalization affected the realm of the
unrecorded, in everyday lived experience. Each
Summer 2018
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of the papers entered that space vividly: Cheong
Soon Gan explored the smells, tastes, the chaos
of markets to gain insight into the deep impress
that the senses make in establishing Western
colonial identities. Chee Kien Lai’s paper
described the literal consumption and
internalization of a fruit that, reimagined,
connected the overseas Chinese to places they
had left and new places they sought to inhabit.
In Mareike Pampus’ paper, the deep corporeal
experience of chopping, frying, grinding, and
cooking in the nynonya kitchen revealed how
chefs both shared or held back the secrets of
cultural and ethnic difference and belonging in
their recipes.
In addition to exploring the concrete experience
and the materiality of food and fruit, the papers
also addressed the crucial notion of cultural
expertise. The British colonial family in Cheong
Soon Gan’s paper had to be fed and sustained—
if they were to survive in Malaya—by a multiracial cast of experts who were capable of “rising
to the challenge of feeding Europeans without
access to European ingredients” but doing so in
a way that not only changed the European way
of eating and tasting, but also connected the local
to the rest of the world—leading to familiarity,
to new forms of expertise, and finally to the point
at which groups in colonial spaces embraced the
other as the norm. Chee Kien Lai’s paper
addressed how expertise took shape in the
everyday—the perfectly rendered overseas
Chinese painter’s canvas that captured a strange
fruit and made it known, the experimentation
with crops and produce until a rambutan,
however unfamiliar it first was to the diasporic
Chinese, reminded them of a lychee, and not
unlike Proust’s famous madeleine, became a way
for them to recall the sensations and tastes of
home.

In Mareike Pampus’ paper, we learned that the
foundation of Nyonya cooking is expert
knowledge—produced, circulated, and transmitted through women, whose very identity was
established not just by knowing how to make a
dish, and how to adjust it, but by demonstrating
its most precise and refined techniques, marked
by such things as fingers yellowed by turmeric,
a trick of salt added at the right moment, and the
finest possible cut of the kaffir lime leaves.
As a whole, the papers demonstrated how
Malaya, Malaysia, and Singapore, situated both
historically and geographically at crossroads of
trade and migration, were buffeted by regional
and global strands and provide us with insights
about culture and identity that go beyond
modern national boundaries. This panel
ultimately considered how cultures feed off each
other and “heat” each other up, or, to extend the
food metaphor more fully, literally “cook” and
ingest each other, allowing us to look how
experiences of the global become specific, local,
blended, and unique.

Summer 2018
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Article
Social Categorization and Religiously
Framed State-Making in Brunei:
From Criminalizing Supernatural Healers
to the Rise of Bureaucratized Exorcism
Dominik M. Müller
This paper has been presented at the workshop “Social
Categorization and Religiously Framed StateMaking in Southeast Asia, organized by the author
together with Matthew Walton and Kevin W. Fogg
at the Asian Studies Centre, St Antony’s College,
University of Oxford on June 4-5, 2018. It is a
shortened and modified version of an article that has
been published in May 2018 by the Journal of
Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37(1): 141-183,
entitled: “Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei
Darussalam: Bureaucratized Exorcism, Scientization and the Mainstreaming of Deviant-Declared
Practices.“ The full article is available at:
https://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1105/1112.

Introduction1
The cultural and political position of Islam in
Brunei is commonly described as conservative
and orthodox. Portrayals of Brunei as a
vanguard of “Islamization” have become
increasingly prominent following international
media reports in 2014 according to which “the
Sultan” had “suddenly” decided to “implement
the Sharia” (sic.). Since the 1980s, the
government has undeniably formalized an
increasingly restrictive state-brand of Islam and
zealously aims to transform its citizenry into
obedient subjects adhering to state-defined
doctrines. However, generalized narratives of
growing Islamization and orthodoxy explain
little about the complex realities, social
meanings and discursive embeddedness of
Brunei’s Islamization policies, and how actors
position themselves towards and within these
processes and thus engage in everyday forms of
the (un-)making and re-making of religiously
framed state power.

The Special Issue, entitled “The Bureaucratisation of
Islam in Southeast Asia: Transdisciplinary
Perspectives”, guest-edited by Dominik M. Müller
and Kerstin Steiner, contains further MSB Studiesrelated articles, including: “Company Rules: Sharia
and its Transgressions in the Malay-Muslim
Corporate Workplace” (Patricia Sloane-White),
“Negotiating Statist Islam: Fatwa and State Policy
in Singapore” (Afif Pasuni), and “Branding Islam:
Islam, Law, and Bureaucracies in Southeast Asia”
(Kerstin Steiner). The issue is available at:
https://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1100/1107

Elsewhere, I have conceptualized the bureaucratization of Islam (BoI) as a social phenomenon
that transcends its organizational boundaries, as
categorical schemes of Islam diffuse into society
and become appropriated (and potentially
transformed) by social actors and institutions
(Müller 2017). In settings such as Brunei, where
governments
have
empowered
Islamic
institutions to influence Muslim discourse, the
BoI often penetrates deeply into public discourse
and everyday life in society. Therefore, the BoI
is not simply a formalization, expansion and
diversification of Islamic institutions, or a
government attempt to control religious actors
and neutralize opposition. It also affects sociocultural transformations and subject formations,

Research for this article was supported by the German
Research Foundation’s Emmy Noether Program, the Max
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology’s Department
“Law & Anthropology”, the National University of
Singapore’s Centre for Asian Legal Studies, and Harvard
University’s “Islamic Legal Studies Program: Law and
Social Change.” I would like to thank Michael Peletz and
Lawrence Rosen for their comments. I am indebted to my
Bruneian interlocutors, and most grateful for the

exceptional openness of the Ministry of Religious Affairs,
the MIB Supreme Council’s Secretariat, and Darusysyifa’
Warrafahah, each of whom helped me with my research and
gave me access to documents and data, while tolerating, as
we spoke about explicitly, that my interpretations will
likely differ from some of their positions. Most names other
than public figures are pseudonyms, and some
circumstantial information has been changed to protect
identities.
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although it does not determine them. The BoI
furthermore goes along with a bureaucratization
of knowledge and related processes of
systematizing and reflecting, which Eickelman
calls
an
“objectification
of
Muslim
consciousness,” resulting in “a significant
reimagining of religious and political
identities.” 2 Accordingly, the BoI implies
distinct epistemic modes of understanding and
organizing the world. These fuse with other
registers and transnational flows, alongside
discursive frames of the nation state, and give
rise to new cultural forms and social meanings of
Islam.
The BoI is entrenched in the empowerment of
“state forms of classification” and their “social
frameworks of perceptions,” “understanding,
“appreciation” and “memory” (Bourdieu
1994:13), which are inscribed to varying extents
into the spheres of habitus. The state’s
classificatory power is therefore not simply
produced by state actors (in the term’s
conventional sense), but co-produced and contested
in society (Müller 2017), while the boundaries
between state- and non-state spheres are
blurring. In this sense, in certain contexts nonstate actors become state-actors as well.
Accordingly, symbolic power, of which state
power and state-imposed social classification are
manifestations, “presupposes, on the part of
those who submit to it, a form of complicity
which is neither passive submission nor a free
adherence to it” (Bourdieu 1991:50–1). Social
actors within and beyond the bureaucracy
position themselves in diverse ways: they do not
simply internalize state-classification to a
“taken-for-granted” and “commonsensical” level
(Handelman & Shamgar-Handelman 1991:294),
or circumvent, pragmatically adapt, subversively
resist, or cautiously navigate between “public”
and “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990), although
Following this concept, Islam “has implicitly been
systematized ... in the popular imagination, making it selfcontained and facilitating innovation. Questions such as
‘What is my religion?’, ‘Why is it important to my life?’, and
‘How do my beliefs guide my conduct?’ have become
foregrounded in the lives of large numbers of believers ...
These transformations also mean that ‘authentic’ religious
2

all of this likely occurs and affects individual
subject formations. Of most relevance here, they
also ascribe their own meanings to hegemonic
discourses and creatively re-signify them, which is
only partly conditioned by existing powerknowledge regimes. Actors may submit to
symbolic state power and participate in its social
production simultaneously inform some of its
contents in originally unanticipated ways. This
paper illustrates such creative state-making with
the example of an Islamic healing center that
incorporates the symbolic language and
categorical schemes of state power in Brunei. It
specializes in exorcism, which had long been the
domain of Malay supernatural specialists whose
once-normalized practices have become
bureaucratically categorized as deviant; growing
segments of the population have internalized
this position as commonsensical Islamic. In this
context, the BoI affects cultural changes and
everyday normativities, but it also informs
agency and creative realizations of the state.
Classificatory Power in the MIB State
Brunei has been conceptualized by its
government as a non-secular “Islamic State” and
“Malay Islamic Monarchy” (Melayu Islam Beraja)
since Independence in 1984. It never established
a parliamentary democracy. Sultan Hassanal
Bolkiah embodies state power more than any
other Southeast Asian leader: he is the prime
minister, minister of finance, of defence, of
foreign affairs and trade, holds absolute
executive powers, and is “head of the official
religion,” i.e. Islam. Constitutionally, he “can do
no wrong in either his personal or any official
capacity.” The sultan enjoys enormous
popularity and, as Bourdieu noted on states more
(maybe too) generally, personally serves as the
country’s “(central) bank of symbolic capital.” 3
This popularity is not just fostered,
choreographed and demanded by statetradition and identity are foregrounded,” but also
“questioned, and constructed rather than taken for granted”
(Eickelman 2015:605).
3 He strikingly resembles the “President” acting as the
Mauss’ian “sorcerer” in Bourdieu’s (1994:11–12) essay on
“structure and genesis in the bureaucratic field, also
pertaining to the “monopoly over nomination”.

10

Berita

11

______________________________________________________________________________

controlled institutions and media, it is also an
undeniable (in a double-sense) social fact that
contributes to upholding the political status quo.
Another stabilizing factor is the oil-funded high
living standards. The Sultan is widely
considered to personally provide Brunei’s
welfare state as a “caring monarch,” a
discursively naturalized term that is normative
for public speech. Poems and patriotic songs, e.g.
those played in state-media during the sultan’s
three week-long birthday celebrations, similarly
emphasize his benevolence and artistically
reproduce the caring monarch motif. 4 With
compelling arguments: There is no personal
income tax, a pension for all citizens from the age
of 60, and largely free education and medical
services.

FIGURE 1: Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s 71st Birthday
Celebrations (Hari Keputeraan ke-71), July 15, 2017. Bandar
Seri Begawan. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©

The “hierarchical reciprocal relationship
between the ruler and his subjects” (Siti
Norkhalbi 2005:247) is also framed as
representing a “traditional Malay” principle
according to which the ruler must be just, the people
must be loyal. Despite standing above the law, the
Sultan is not perceived as an arbitrary ruler or
dictator by any significant societal grouping.
With his promotion of the rule of law and
accountability, his rule comes closer to what
These activities also include patriotic competitions by
artists, graffiti sprayers, poets, musicians and dancers, who
create spaces of agency for themselves, simultaneously
enabled and restricted by the event’s royal/patriotic/statecontrolled context (as I describe in forthcoming work on
4

Turner (2015) calls soft-authoritarianism in the
Singaporean context.

Institutionalizing a National
Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB)

Ideology:

The government seeks to instill a “national
ideology” called Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) in the
population’s minds and behavior. MIB privileges
Malay supremacy, Islam (as interpreted by the
state, no other Islam), and the monarchy. As a
bureaucratic categorical scheme, MIB is at the
heart of the state’s attempted exercise of
classificatory power. Officially, MIB has been in
place since the first Sultan converted to Islam in
1368. In the Declaration of Independence, the
Sultan proclaimed Brunei “shall be forever a …
Malay, Muslim Monarchy upon the teachings of
(Sunni) Islam.“ MIB became institutionalized,
and Brunei-specific notions of Melayu, Islam, and
the monarchy became translated into the
language of bureaucracy. In 1986, an MIB
Concept
Committee
was
established,
transformed in 1990 into the MIB Supreme
Council. Since 1991/2, MIB classes are
compulsory in schools and universities.
The MIB Supreme Council is defining,
systematizing and propagating MIB. It prepares
curricula, teaching materials, and publications.
Its Secretariat constantly reminds citizens of
their obligations towards the MIB State (Negara
MIB). One of its leaders, Muhammad Hadi
Muhammad Melayong (2013), argues that
MIB’s “values ... are innate for every Bruneian,”
a descriptive claim and normative expectation.
In a former Minister of Education’s words:
“Every individual is responsible for practicing,
appreciating, and strengthening the concept of
MIB” (Dewan Majlis 2014:473). The
government insists on exclusively defining MIB
(its “interpretation must be protected”). MIB
propagation underwent various changes. It is
presently taught in a more interactive and
activating manner, resembling transnational
the Royal Birthday). This can also be considered everyday
forms of, to varying extents religiously framed, state-making,
which are embedded in wider discursive arenas of locally
unique Brunei-specific state-making.
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pedagogical trends. Learners should become
“multipliers.“ The Council tries to “maximize”
quantified “success rates.” Another new trend is
to encourage “critical thinking”—about how to
strengthen MIB. The Council pursues “five-year
working plans” and distinguishes eight
propagation fields and target groups. By
“educationally empowering” these groups to
themselves empower MIB, the authorities seek
to make the BoI transcend its institutional
boundaries: MIB should not simply be statedictated and obeyed, but society should actively
strengthen it and thus co-produce the state’s
classificatory power. As the Council also
integrates other institutions and companies
under a “multi-agency approach,” boundaries
between state, society and the market blur in
many ways and the MIB-State takes a
paramount interest in fostering a state-insociety understanding of good citizenship.

FIGURE 2: Secretariat of the MIB Supreme Council,
Located at the University of Brunei Darussalam’s Campus,
Gadong. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©

The Council’s outreach includes e.g. lectures,
courses,
briefings,
exhibitions,
camps,
competitions and media propagation. Bruneians
are intensely exposed to MIB discourse and its
normative expectations for public and private
behavior. They are not only subject to control
and disciplining, but also to the MIB discourse’s
everyday didactics and meaning-production. Even
those who circumvent or deliberately resist the
state’s pedagogical aspirations can rarely evade
being affected by its symbolic power and
classificatory practices. For Bruneians below 40,
the MIB-educated generation, being MIB

citizens and being expected to present
themselves as such in certain spaces has become
inscribed, to varying extents, into their habitus.
This is often accompanied by equally
habitualized hidden transcripts, negotiations and
insecurities, also among MIB propagators.
Nevertheless, MIB deeply affects their
lifeworlds.

The Firewall of MIB and its Supernatural
Counterforces

As the Bruneian scholar Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad
Kumpoh
(2011:39)
put
it, somewhat
paradoxically, in post-colonial Brunei the “status
of religious tolerance ... remained unchanged,”
but there have been “cultural changes where
activities ... which did not conform to Islamic
teaching could no longer be tolerated.“ This may
be a logical contradiction for the uninitiated
(“tolerance unchanged” vs. “can no longer be
tolerated”), but for many Bruneians it is not. It
sums up two locally powerful themes: 1) feeling
misrepresented by foreigners as intolerant/radical, whereas in reality, Bruneian Islam
would be “moderate” and oriented towards
“harmonious” relations with everybody; and 2)
the banning of supernatural traditions that long
have been central to everyday life. The latter, in
the now hegemonic logic, is not a question of
freedom of religious practice and thus
(potentially) tolerable, but of protecting the very
essence of Islam and Muslim souls.
In 2015, the Sultan famously called MIB a
“firewall” against unwanted elements of
globalization invading Brunei. The itself
globalized metaphor’s underlying idea points to
a long-standing view contrasting Brunei
Darussalam (Abode of Peace) with a “zone of
disorder” (Braighlinn 1992:51, 57) abroad.
Undesired “external” elements are not just
alternative readings of Islam, militant ideologies,
non-Muslim missionaries, and “immoral” or
“Westernized” behaviors, they also pertain to
“widely accepted symbolism(s)” of the
supernatural, which are deeply rooted in the
Malay “cultural vocabulary” (a term borrowed
from Herzfeld 1992:57). One “no longer
tolerable” tradition that Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad

12

Berita

13

______________________________________________________________________________

Kumpoh (2011:50) mentions are “[c]elebrations
at spirit shrines” (Müller 2017). The Islamic
bureaucracy conceptualizes the state as a
protector of Muslim souls: It is obliged and
accountable towards God to realize the principle
of enjoining good and forbidding wrong. Nowadays,
the Malay mainstream similarly views many
banned traditions as deviant and/or outdated.
This view was fostered by state-Islamic
education, but also takes inspiration from
bottom-up trends. Other deviant-declared
practices are certain Malay customs (adat) e.g. in
wedding ceremonies, dances, dress, and some
royal regalia. A government khutbah sermon
recently told Muslims not to shake hands with
members of the opposite sex who are not their
spouses or certain relatives (mahram), an
instruction that many, including state elites,
ignored, and which is not enforced. In other
fields, the bureaucracy takes action: A striking
example is supernatural specialists/healers
(bomoh). Their status has changed from “an
indispensable figure in a Malay village” whose
existence was largely “taken for granted” (Mohd
Taib 1988:157) to a shadowy criminal figure who
engages in syirik (sin) and khurafat (superstition,
but the translation is misleading). Although the
social institution of bomoh has long been widely
accepted, under the MIB State’s claim to
classificatory power, it can, officially and under
that term, no longer be tolerated, resulting in farreaching changes in everyday lifeworlds. Bomoh
as a social institution, and certain individuals in
particular have always been surrounded by
ambivalence, due to their fascinating but
suspicious access to invisible worlds (Peletz
1993:155). This ambivalence has been
restructured and revalorized vis-à-vis policies
that aim to govern individual practices/beliefs,
and in ways that focus on the negative side of
things. Thus, this transformation pushed
forward by “state actors” engaging in social
categorization is not a historical rupture per se,
although the changes are dramatic.
Social Imaginaries and Bureaucratized
Representations of Black Magic
Notwithstanding these normative shifts, beliefs
in the omnipresence of sorcery remain integral

to social imaginaries and ontological realities.
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) officers
showed me two exhibitions of confiscated magic
objects: All had been “cleaned, as officer Khairul
explained. Yet, sounds had come from the room
after dark, nobody would enter it at night. He
also narrated how a MoRA scholar had tested a
talisman for “academic” purposes: “it worked, he
was unable to cut his skin.”
Opened in 2007, a theme room called “Objects
Leading to the Deviation from the True
Doctrine” became the MoRA’s most popular
exhibition. The purpose was pedagogical, to
explain “what is prohibited, what you cannot do,
and cannot sell.” Khairul added, “20 years ago,
Islamic education was not as strong as now.” In
particular, some elders would still trust bomohs
and practice deviant traditions, although this
would gradually change since the 1990s. Some
exhibited objects had been used for protection
from other people’s magic, for business profits,
love magic, or to become temporarily invisible or
invincible. There were protective bottles with
mystical symbols, numbers and Arabic letters
that “offenders” place above doors, and
cooking/eating bowls with inscribed chants,
kept in restaurants to enhance revenues.

FIGURE 3: “Exhibition of Objects Leading to the
Deviation from the True Doctrine (akidah)”. Ministry of
Religious Affairs. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©
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FIGURE 4: Confiscated Objects Assumedly Used for
Magic Practices, on Exhibition for Educational Purposes.
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Bandar Seri Begawan. Picture
by Dominik M. Müller ©.

Some restaurant owners had been elderly
Malays “who still believe in such methods.”
Khairul himself had investigated such a case.
Elders would stop once they were “strongly
exposed” to the “right information.” Other
objects are protective rings, often found in a
suspicious mix, e.g. wrapped in yellow cloth
indicating “worshipping.” When objects are
confiscated at post offices or borders, they are
sent to the MoRA for investigation. Some are
“harmless,” others are “used for special purposes,
although owners themselves often don’t exactly
know what.” Usually no legal action is taken but
they remain confiscated. At the second
exhibition of objects confiscated within the
country, officers showed me pictures of a
graveyard where photographs of a target person
of sorcery had been buried, wrapped in
underwear. They regularly find pictures. An
officer joked, “we confiscate so many, we
sometimes know the people on them, possibly it’s
one of us!” This concerns many Bruneians: An
MIB officer told me how friends recommended
him not to use a photograph on Facebook, it
could be used by enemies.

FIGURE 5: A Picture that Went Viral in Brunei in 2015,
Reportedly Used to Harm a Civil Servant Named Hassan
through Black Magic, Confiscated by Religious Authorities.
Source: Social Media.

Arif, a Doctrine Control officer argued
“theoretically bomoh practice can be good if it is
not against Islam.” If a hospital is far away, a
good bomoh, who, he added, should rather be
called orang pandai, might provide helpful herbs.
But even well-intentioned orang pandai would
often unintendedly engage spirits/demons.
There is no consensus what defines the
difference between bomoh and orang pandai and
whether they are necessarily “deviant.” The trend
is to categorically view bomoh as deviant and
orang pandai more undecidedly with mixed
suspicion and admiration. Bomoh do not call
themselves bomoh anymore, as the term has
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acquired a de-legitimizing stigma. Some are
called Cikgu/Ustaz (teacher), albeit in one case in
2017, a healer called himself Yang Keramat Agong
(“holding superior powers”). Arif estimated
“hundreds” of remaining bomoh, “70-80%
foreigners,” mainly Indonesians. Local bomoh
were mostly elders (“kampung people”), who
learned “from generation to generation” and
whose often-unintended deviance was mainly
about interacting with jin. No next generation
would follow them any longer. For many
students, exchanging supernatural stories is part
of their daily life, and in addition more subtle
state-influences, some directly refer to statepower. Ramlee shared with me a “first hand
story,” of which he was convinced, about a
certain Prince having a room for his dagger
collection that was haunted. A keris “stood in the
room” haunted by several spirits, causing
troubled family relations. The Prince, following
the narration, called an Indonesian “good bomoh”
who “cleaned” the room, performed prayers and
brought away the keris, refusing any payment.
Ramlee added that some believed the Prince
himself has “powers”: “he can walk up walls, like
Spiderman!” Ramlee also shared a story, known
by other interlocutors, that the sultan’s late
father, Omar Ali Saufuddin had supernatural
powers “like other Sultans before” and could
control the rain by twisting his moustache. The
main institution responsible for “controlling”
religious deviance is the MoRA’s Doctrine
Control Unit. It organizes surveillance, temporal
arrests, “faith rehabilitation,” and maintains a 24hour hotline. 38 bomoh were arrested in 2004, 55
in 2005. Later statistics list smaller numbers. In
2001, first calls proposed bomohs “should
register” (Borneo Bulletin 2001). Soon afterwards,
the state’s stance became less ambivalent.
I interviewed Mas and his wife, who spied on a
bomoh’s community for the MoRA as his
“helpers.“ Both have attractive private sector
jobs and narrated their motivation as ethical: As
the bomoh was cheating and spiritually harming
his patients/disciples, spying was a “duty.” They
fulfilled the expectation for good citizens to coproduce/strengthen
the
MIB
state’s
classificatory power as “multipliers” in society.

Bomoh cases are normally settled outside of
courts, through warnings and “voluntary” reeducation called counselling (kaunseling). In fact,
the authorities focus on “education” and “mercy”
much more than punishment. Yet, Arif lauded
that the new Islamic penal code would place his
work on more solid legal grounds: Muslims
worshipping “any person, place, nature or any
object, thing or animal in any manner” contrary
to Islamic Law, or making “(a)n act or statement
that shows faith to any object, thing or animal”
possessing “power,” e.g. “the ability to bring
good luck, increas(ing) wealth, grant(ing)
wishes, heal(ing) diseases and others”, could be
punished by imprisonment, fines and kaunseling.
(Muslims claiming they “or any other person
knows an event or a matter that is beyond human
understanding, contradicting Islamic teachings:
max. 10 years, caning, repentance; advertising
black magic: max. 5 years; attempted murder
max. 10 years, for further details see my original
article).
Sharia-Compliant Healing, Water-Crystals
and the Reconfiguration of “Deviant”Declared Practices
Parallel to the socio-legal marginalization of
bomoh, Brunei witnessed the rise of “Shariacompliant” Islamic healing/exorcism. Stateulama have long conducted such practices
officially and unofficially, but the most insightful
example for my analytic purposes, and biggest
trend, is Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah (DS), an
institution locally established in 2007. Its model
was the Malaysian Darusyifa’, founded by the
late Haron Din, a former Islamic Studies
professor and Spiritual Leader of the Islamic
Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia,
PAS). Haron Din was Malaysia’s most
prominent expert of the invisible world: his
books were bestsellers, and he was admired
across political divides. Many Bruneians
admired him too, including a small group who
first met him at a dinner at the palace and
developed the idea of establishing a branch.
Haron Din repeatedly visited Brunei upon the
Sultan’s invitation and was “cleared” to
teach/speak about Islam-related matters. As one
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of the founders, a former civil servant from the
education sector, narrated, it took time before
they were able to receive permission from the
Registrar of Organisations (ROS). They finally
set up DS, a “non-state” Islamic organization,
usually impossible to establish and non-existent
in Brunei. De facto Haron Din was its supreme
teacher, but pro forma it is an independent
organization. Its “governing committee” reports
all activities to the ROS, and the organizational
structure follows the ROS’s obligatory pattern
and bureaucratic terminology.
Brunei’s DS offers a standardized one-year
curriculum course on the “basics of Islamic
healing, using Haron Din’s writings. Students
learn purpose-specific Quranic verses, recitation
patterns and “ethics.” Their Certificate entitles
them to practice as volunteers at the center
and/or privately. In 2014, 500 people were
actively involved (in 2017, the number had
grown to 700!), from diverse backgrounds, but
all were necessarily Muslims. Patients also
included non-Muslims, e.g. Chinese Bruneians,
Filipino and Thai guest workers, and a Japanese
manager who hired DS after spectacular
“disturbances” in his company. The number of
certified healers and treated patients/places
grew annually.

FIGURES 6, 7 & 8: Numbers of Patients Treated, Healers
Certified and Houses/Offices “Cleaned” by DS Annually in
Brunei. Source: Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah.

DS categorizes three treatment fields:
“Physical,” “spiritual,” and “disturbances.”
Disturbances are caused by jin and/or sorcery,
affect individuals or places, and may result in
“possession” or “hysteria”. They may also be
manifested by poisoning, a classical bomoh tool in
Malay social imaginaries. Sometimes jin
“accompany” people, some consciously own and
feed them, until “in the end, the jin owns them.”
Jin ownership can also be hereditary. During
exorcism, Muslim jin would often leave the body
“if they are told in Islamic terms, but not always!”
Infidel jin are considered more challenging, but
they can convert, which is utilized in exorcism
strategies. One should avoid speaking with them
(“they lie the whole time”), but if they want to
convert, healers must assist. Jin speaking
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through possessed patients happened “twice a
week.” More frequent disturbances are not
manifested by alien voices. “Often there is no
clear identification of the cause: jin, syaitan, we
don’t want to know, what counts is successful
healing!”
When I visited the center one evening in 2014,
all 10 treatment rooms were occupied. I
witnessed a “disturbance” treatment: Maryam’s
sister had tried to heal her “by copying DS
without knowing the right method, then a jin
became involved,” a healer explained. Black spots
emerged on her skin, she went to DS. A female
healer exorcized Maryam, who made long
buzzing noises before throwing up when the jin
assumedly left her body, a pattern the healer
expected. I was told this is a dangerous moment.
In its previous smaller building, spirits
“sometimes jumped from one person to the
next.” The situation improved after the DS clinic
was enlarged, with partitions to provide
enclosed treatment spaces, partly enabled by
funding from the private sector, from which DS
continues to receive donations. After the
exorcism, Maryam received a mixture of herbal
leaves and rice powder to shower with.
Medicines can be purchased but are free for
patients. In most other cabins, counselling took
place for issues such as social/family problems,
to be solved by Quranic rather than traditional
bomoh means. Many patients visited bomoh before
they came, a DS healer stated. Common advice is
to pray the right prayers in the right way,
remember Allah, and observe Islamic norms for
social behavior.

In 2010, a “mass hysteria” hit three schools during
examinations time. Even “teachers” and “the school’s cook”
were “possessed,” before DS ... solved it. It began when a
“student cried after seeing a spirit.” A teacher commented
“the spirit also made several demands. But the religious
5

FIGURE 9: A Certified Darusysyifa’ Healer Treating a
Woman Assumed to be “Disturbed.“ Kampong Manggis.
Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©

DS also exorcizes state buildings, e.g. the national
hospital, university, and an Arabic school for
girls (closed after mass-hysteria). 5 DS’ first
graduation ceremony was held at a Ministry of
Defence building. In return, DS “cleaned” it.
Disturbances had occurred, particularly after
dawn: A solider “heard somebody calling him,
found a man at a table, asked why he had called
him, suddenly the person was gone!” During the
exorcism “a door opened and closed by itself, but
not in the direction in which it would have been
pushed by the wind, the other direction! Banners
at the wall were shaking, a lamp stopped
working.” After the exorcism the disturbances
stopped. DS also cleaned the Friendship Bridge
to Malaysia to secure its ceremonial opening. A
worker had seen “an old Honda Accord” on the
not-yet-opened bridge occupied by a man and
expert … told us not to meet the demands as it was the
voice of Satan” (ibid.) The acting Minister of Education
“advised the school authorities to clean the restrooms,
believed to be the favorite spot for the spirits …” (see my
original article for references and further details)
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child. While asking what they were doing there,
“the car suddenly vanished.”
But DS’s engagement with state power goes
beyond state-prescribed bureaucratic forms and
cleaning jobs. When the first healers graduated,
the sultan launched a DS event at the
Convention Centre. His son Prince Malik
became DS’ “patron.” Princes Sufri and Jefri, the
sultan’s brothers, also visited DS events. These
visits expressed royal endorsement and provided
the locally most powerful form of symbolic
capital. Photographs in DS annual reports
documented this legitimation of the highest
order. DS’s graduation reports share a similar
structure: A full-page portrait of His Majesty on
the first page, Prince Malik on the second. In
2013, the third page carried a text thanking
Prince Malik and emphasizing popular “trust” in
DS, adding that “the people” now turn away from
bomoh. In the first report, a picture showed
Harun Din standing next to the Sultan, the
Crown Prince, and Prince Malik, symbolizing
his royal acceptance. A picture of the State Mufti
on the same page symbolized the Islamic
bureaucracy’s equally crucial endorsement. In
2009 the Mufti, himself a book and fatwa author
on Islamic healing, inaugurated the year’s course
with a speech. Some course events were held on
the MoRA’s premises, which underlines its
proximity (“blurring boundaries”) to the state’s
BoI. The DS leaders I spoke with stressed their
contribution to MIB and the Sultan’s goal of
Brunei as Negara Zikir (“a nation that always
remembers Allah”) under his Vision 2035 6 .
Through all these references to and cooperation
with state power, DS stages conformity with the
MIB State’s normative expectations for good
citizenship, expressed through powerful
symbolic codes in a specific cultural vocabulary.
It is a necessary condition for its existence to coproduce the MIB State’s classificatory power, yet
its leaders passionately believe in that project.
In another instance of appropriating powerful state
symbols in legitimating their work, DS members told me
how the Sultan once saw a possessed girl at a school in 2005,
asking the jin: “Why do you possess her? Get out of this
girl!” He was successful, “because he is the khailfah.” He has
6

But through the very act of establishing DS, they
not only reproduce state power but also inform
some of its meanings in ways that were neither
originally planned nor expected by the architects
of the government’s BoI. They created spaces of
agency by appropriating symbolic state power for
their own purposes.
Some certificate holders are ex-bomoh: “Some
admit it openly,” but DS would not ask about
“earlier mistakes,” following Haron Din’s advice
not to expose sins. They believed that the role of
bomoh was declining due to DS work, state
education, and the MoRA’s dakwah. As one
representative stated enthusiastically, “now
there is an alternative!” There is clearly demand.
An academic told me how his father had
practiced traditional healing in the family before
attending DS’s course to learn the proper way.
Just like former bomoh, people like him can purify
and re-legitimize their work vis-à-vis hegemonic
power-knowledge structures and simultaneously
protect their souls. The strong interest in the
services previously provided by bomoh, now by
DS, results from requirements that persist.
Peletz (1993:150) described sorcery and
consulting bomohs in Malaysia as “counterparts
of formal social exchange” relating to personal
vulnerabilities and “concerns with autonomy and
social control.“ Supernatural knowledge (ilmu)
entails “power to influence other people and to
maintain one’s autonomy in the face of
countervailing forces invoked by others who aim
to limit it,” particularly “in societies in which one
never really knows what is in the minds of
others.” In the MIB State, the normative
parameters for handling such anxieties have
shifted, resulting in a gap that DS, with its
bureaucratically certified services, offers to fill.
MoRA officers stressed that “not everything
labelled DS” was unproblematic; e.g. a bomoh had
falsely claimed certification. Even certified
healers would “not all practice the right way.”
powers, not only over humans, over everything, over all
makhluk (creations) in his country.” They added: Some
loggers tell trees, themselves makhluk, creations of Allah,
they have the Sultan’s permission (compare Skeat
1900:194).
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One had touched a woman claiming a jin made
him do it. Another “misused” a certificate he
brought to kaunseling to prove his innocence.
Some “turn to the wrong direction again.” Such
transgressions indicate yet other modes of
creating agency by appropriating powerful
symbols of the state; namely by reference to DS’
state-approved bureaucratic certification and the
authorizing powers it provides (in the age of
“self-making-by-faking,” Comaroff & Comaroff
2016:xvii).
DS healing services for free. Patients “can donate
if they wish” and “pay as much as they like.”
Bomoh and orang pandai use the same wording.
DS is funded by donations, but also sells
products exposed to prayers (herbs, oil, honey).
This, too, presents an uneven continuation of
bomoh practices of praying into oil or water,
although DS views these as entirely different:
one realizes divine normativity through
authentic verses, the other engages demonic
forces, through lacking education or on purpose.
DS’s bestselling item during in 2014 was prayedupon water, stored in large boxes at its premises.

FIGURE 10: Pictures of Water-Crystals (“Before” and
“After Having Been Exposed to Prayers”, and “zamzam Water”) Placed at the Walls of DS’ Headquarters.
Kampong Manggis. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©

FIGURE 11: Healing Products (That Have Been Exposed
to Prayers, sudah dizikirkan) on Sale at DS’ Headquarters.
Kampong Manggis. Picture by Dominik M. Müller ©

DS leaders showed me a PowerPoint
Presentation visualizing the powers of their
healing water through microscopic photographs
of water crystals. DS had sent frozen samples to
a Japanese water photographer, M. Emoto
(1943-2014). Emoto was internationally
renowned among esoteric circles for his water
experiments. In academia, his work is dismissed
as pseudo-scientific, to which he once responded
it was merely art. For my interlocutors, it
possessed academic character. This added yet
another cultural register and powerful
vocabulary of legitimation, which is inherent to
the BoI: the quest for scientific evidence in the
construction of facts (Latour & Woolgar 1979),
and its importance for convincing others.
Samples included average water, water exposed
to “4444 prayers” (selawat tafrijiyah), to zikir
prayers, and zam-zam water from Mecca. Emoto
assumes water “has a memory” (acoustic/visual):
Negative influences “break the micro-crystals”
but water also “remembers” positive influences.
Going beyond Emoto’s interpretive frame, the
DS leaders stated “water is a creation of Allah”
(makhluk Allah). And going beyond established
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Sunni discourse, they explained water “can hear”
and “has feelings.”
Emoto compared DS’s samples with others, e.g.
exposed to rock music. He was fascinated, they
told me. The pictures left little doubt: Prayedupon water exhibited the “most beautiful”
structures. Other samples had gradually less fine
structures. Heavy metal-exposed water was the
“worst, destroyed.” The crystals exposed to zikir
prayers looked exceptional, but the tafrijiyahexposed water (by Haron Din) went even beyond
that: “Emoto had never seen anything like that!”
For DS, Emoto’s pictures and the PowerPoint
presentation visualized the invisible and
objectively proved their work’s effectiveness.
The scientific character was also stressed at a DS
symposium in 2013, attended by Emoto, Haron
Din, and the State Mufti. Emoto presented a
“working paper,” “The Science of Beautiful
Water”. The program, mistakenly calling him
“Prof.” described Emoto as a “scientific expert”
(pakar saintifik) presenting “scientific findings.“
Pictures of water crystals decorated a wall in
DS’s building. The cover of one graduation
report also showed crystals. These, and the ideas
attached to them, had become part of DS’s
culture of self-presentation. DS’ sold its water
for 70c. per bottle (“some people drink it every
day”) as a medicine, and for protection from harm
or disturbances, which, earlier would have been
done e.g. through talismans, or water (or other
natural products) prayed-upon by a bomoh.
Concluding Remarks: Hybrid Pathways to
State-Imposed Orthodoxy
As a socio-cultural phenomenon, the BoI in Brunei
is deeply informed by the MIB State’s discursive
substrate and its political economy. Boundaries
between state and society are in many ways made
blurring through educational means, and by
non-state actors themselves who appropriate the
state’s powerful symbolic forms and bureaucratic
schemes. Therefore, the BoI informs social and
cultural transformations, as the state’s
classificatory schemes diffuse into society and
become actively embedded in everyday
lifeworlds. Yet, the BoI does not simply

determine these transformations, as the case of
DS and the creative agency involved illustrates.
Such appropriations of (symbolic) state power do
not simply reproduce it, but also often serve to
ascribe new meanings to it and thus engage in
their own modes of religiously framed statemaking. The politics of self-declared orthodox
purification become creatively re-embedded into
both pre-existing cultural vocabularies and the
discursive arena of the nation state, while
simultaneously drawing upon transnational
cultural flows from multiple sources. Some
deviant-declared practices become reinvented
within the symbolic parameters of the MIB
State, alongside the more universal languages of
bureaucracy, cultural globalization, modern
nationalism, marketization, and scientization,
statisticalization and technocratization (see e.g.
Greenhalgh 2008), among various other
hybridized registers. The reconfiguration at play
here departs from, but goes beyond what
Herzfeld (1992:35, see my original article for
further discussion) calls “the organic part played
by symbols in creating the new order out of the
old”: The MIB State’s BoI, as a socio-cultural
phenomenon, of which bureaucratized exorcism
is one of many manifestations, here also
integrates a vertiginous mixture of other
influences, such as Japanese water-photography,
the objectifying powers of PowerPoint, digital
metaphors, future-oriented corporate governance, and transnational trends in pedagogy.
Such accommodative reconfigurations should
not be surprising, as they reflect a more general
global condition. What makes the Bruneian case
special, among other things, is how the MIB
State, and “state actors” in the term’s expanded
sense, seek to purify local culture through
zealous Islamization policies, yet the pathways
towards realizing this orthodoxy are remarkably
hybrid. Such micro-level negotiations of state
power, and of ascribing/deriving one’s own
meanings from/to the state, tell a different story
from the meta-narratives of state-driven
Islamization that dominate portrayals of Brunei
and often narrowly draw upon official policies,
government declarations, and legal provisions.
Bureaucratized thinking, speaking and planning
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informs the quest for objectified evidencemaking, as manifested in DS’s case of waterphotography or the MIB bureaucracy’s
statistical success rates, “visions and missions”
and five-year-plans, among others. The
systematization and reflection that Eickelman
(2015) calls an “objectification of Muslim
consciousness” form a necessary condition. In
objectified modes of being Muslim, earlier
practices and social institutions, such as the
bomoh, are systematically re-examined vis-à-vis
their
(un)Islamicness.
Yet,
subsequent
“abandonments” are culturally productive
endeavors and should be analyzed as such,
instead of reproducing their self-idealizing logics
by describing them in their own terms. The
alternative would be what Bourdieu et al.
(1994:1) call “the risk of taking over (or being
taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of
applying to the state categories of thought
produced and guaranteed by the state.”
Simultaneously globalized and unique, the MIB
State has its own “culture of world-making, truth
making, knowledge-making, state-making,
nation-making” in a world where actors engage
in an “endless quest to recapture” what once had
been “sovereign certainties of modernity,
certainties that seem to be slipping away, widely
mourned, irrecoverable” (Comaroff 2016:xiv). In
this longing for certainties, the more impossible
it gets to draw fixed boundaries, the more
passionate (if not desperate) many actors try to
(re-)install them. The BoI’s quest for objectified
evidence is integral to such searching for
undisputable certainties. Yet, social actors
within and beyond the state apparatus,
themselves also construct, modify, and
sometimes challenge the truths of states that
claim sovereignty over their lives. Members of
DS in this sense participate in such religiously
framed state-, nation-, knowledge- and truthmaking processes through creative techniques
and seek to bring order into a world that they
perceive as being fundamentally threatened by a
dialectical interplay of visible and invisible
disturbances.
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Article
A New Dawn for Malaysia:
The Election that Tipped the Balance
Mohamed Nawab Osman, Aida Arosoaie,
Rashaad Ali, Prashant Waikar, Chan Xin
Ying and Najwa Abdullah
On May 9, 2018, Malaysians made history. For
the first time since 1957, the incumbent coalition
Barisan Nasional (BN) suffered a devastating
defeat both in the state and federal legislative
assemblies. With the exception of the thenopposition’s leader, Mahathir Mohamad, the
final polls bewildered the wider public, scholars
and numerous Malaysian politicians. When
everyone predicted a marginal victory for the
BN, Mahathir rallied across Peninsular Malaysia
prophesying that his coalition, Pakatan Harapan
(PH), would re-write the fate of Malaysian
politics. The 92-year-old astute politician, also
Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister from
1981 until 2003, switched sides in 2015 when he
broke away from the United Malay National
Organisation (UMNO), the leading party of BN,
to form his own political outfit Parti Pribumi
Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu). And so begins the
GE14 (14th Malaysian General Election) saga.
The fractionalization of UMNO and the
Mahathir persona were crucial factors that led to
BN’s defeat, but they were not the most
important. Instead, two other issues emerged as
key factors of this election which informed the
electorate’s change of heart, and government.
Firstly, voters across all states complained about
the rising cost of living, blaming it squarely on
the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax
(GST). This explains the markedly populist
nature of the different political parties’
manifestos. The BN manifesto proposed
establishing a special bank to facilitate loans for
affordable and low-cost housing priced
RM300,000 and below. 1 The PH promised to
“Bersama BN Hebatkan Negaraku,” Barisan Nasional,
April 7, 2018, https://www.barisannasional.org.my/wp1

abolish the GST, while PAS has offered to
provide monthly financial assistance and cash
incentives to single mothers, the youth and the
poor. Secondly, race and religion remained
important considerations for many voters, even
if explicitly or implicitly acknowledged. BN
continued playing the religious card in trying to
win the support of Muslim voters especially in
the northern states. The UMNO incumbent
Chief Minister of Terengganu promised the
party would allow for the implementation of
hudud in the event of its victory. PAS has also
invoked religion in its campaign within
Kelantan, describing the party’s struggle to hold
the Kelantanese government as a jihad (holy
struggle). Fearing a potential tacit understanding between Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS)—the country’s main Islamist party—and
UMNO, which would lead to further decimation
of their rights, many non-Muslim voters chose
to support the Pakatan Harapan. The decision
was mostly based on PH’s apparently more
inclusive policies vis-à-vis the management of
religion. The use of religion was not limited to
Muslim politicians. In Sabah, Maximus Ongkili,
a member of the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS),
joined a prayer session with church leaders at his
residence to pray for this victory in the polls.
Yet, beyond contextualized strategic use, neither
BN, PH nor PAS made race and religion the
focus of their manifestos. However, the results
emphasized the continued relevance of these
issues, as they informed both parties’ choice of
fielding candidates and the electorate’s
preferences.
Rotting From Within:
UMNO’s Fractionalization
In 2015, the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad
(1MDB), a strategic development fund managed
entirely by the Minister of Finance, made
headlines worldwide as one of the biggest
corruption cases in the world. Former Prime
Minister Najib Razak, the Chairman of the fund,
was accused of having siphoned USD$700
million from the investment fund into his own
content/uploads/2018/04/Manifesto-Barisan-NasionalBersama-BN-Hebatkan-NegaraKu-Malay.pdf
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account. The US Justice Department filed a
lawsuit against Najib, revealing that most the
money was spent on purchases of yachts and
properties, jewelry, Picasso and Van Gogh
paintings and the production of two Hollywood
movies. 2 In a shocking move Mahathir left
UMNO to form his own party, Bersatu, as a sign
of protest against Najib’s misconduct: Mahathir
claimed he was too embarrassed to be associated
with a corrupt party.3
With Bersatu joining the opposition, Mahathir
had to join hands with Anwar Ibrahim, his
former Deputy Prime Minister whom he ousted
and subsequently jailed in 1998 on charges of
corruption and sodomy. 4 They formed a
leadership configuration which turned out to be
defining for GE14. Their dynamic can be better
understood as a contest of masculinities, wherein
both Mahathir and Anwar, the former notorious
for his iron fist rule from 1981 until 2003,
adopted distinctively feminine traits to mark the
state of the emergency of the country: Mahathir
released a video in which he wept while
expressing his remorse for supporting Najib’s
political ascendancy, 5 and both Mahathir and
Anwar forgave each other, labelling their
gesture as a sacrifice for the Malaysian people.6
At the core of the matter, they both highlighted,
lied million Malaysians, with an emphasis on the
Malays, whom Najib betrayed with his corrupt
behavior.
The state of Johor, a semi-urban state with a
mixed ethnic population, provides a useful
example for examining national trends at the
state level. Barisan Nasional suffered significant
defeats in Johor, a state it has traditionally
dominated.7 Pakatan Harapan (PH) succeeded in
H. Ellis-Petersen (2018), “Malaysian PM claims there was
no wrongdoing in 1MDB scandal,” The Guardian, April 26.
3 “I will never return to ‘badly damaged’ UMNO, says Dr
Mahathir,” The Malaysian Insight (2017), July 28.
4 T. Pepinsky (2018), “Can Mahathir Mohamed be
Malaysia’s First Democratically Elected Prime Minister?”
Asia Unbound, Council for Foreign Relations.
5 “2018 Dr. Mahathir Cried (Touching),” Youtube, April 28,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3dhMBQLKgU
6 H. Ellis-Petersen (2018), “’This election is personal’:
Mahathir Mohamad, 92, vows to stop ‘corrupt’ protégé,”
2

winning 18 of 28 parliamentary seats, building
on their five seats from the last general election
in 2013. At the state assembly level, PH won 36
of the 56 seats. This became 39 seats after three
UMNO state assemblymen switched to PH, thus
giving the coalition two-thirds majority.8 BN’s
defeat in Johor can be attributed to two main
factors: former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s
unpopularity and cost-of-living issues. Due to
the various scandals surrounding his
administration, Najib’s unpopularity proved too
much to stave off the image the Barisan Nasional
state government in Johor had carefully curated.
Much of the campaign was dedicated to the
successes of the state government, employing
the state-level nationalism of Bangsa Johor to
specifically appeal to Johorean’s identity and coopting this in their favor. The state government
went to great lengths to divorce their image
from Najib, which included eschewing Najib’s
image on their campaign material from
brochures to billboards, creating their own
detailed manifesto, and not inviting him to Johor
during the campaign period. 9 BN was already
experiencing a downward voting trend in the
past two elections, including in traditional
Malay/Felda areas while many seats particularly
at the parliament level were marginal. 10 So,
although BN was expected to lose some seats,
the extent of their losses is truly significant
especially given the efforts made by the local
administration to disassociate themselves from
the federal government. Despite this, Johor
citizens issued a protest vote against Najib at the
ballot box.
The results in Sabah, one of the two East
Malaysian states, further emphasized this point.
The Guardian, May 2.
7 F. E. Hutchinson (2018), “GE-14 in Johor: The Fall of the
Fortress?”, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.3.
8 Amar Shah Mohsen (2018), “Don’t rush decisions,
prioritise party members, Muhyiddin tells Johor MB,” The
Sun Daily, May 16.
9 R. Ali (2018), “Commentary: To win over Johor voters,
politicians compete to represent the Johor identity,”
Channel NewsAsia, May 8.
10 F. E. Hutchinson (2018), “GE-14 in Johor: The Fall of the
Fortress?”, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.3.
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In the 2013 Malaysian General Election (GE13),
Barisan Nasional won 88% of Sabah’s
parliamentary seats and 80% of the state
assembly seats.11 In Sarawak, the other state in
East Malaysia, BN won over 80% of the federal
seats. 12 GE14 saw a dramatic shift in BN’s
electoral fortunes. It won just 40% of federal
seats and 48% of state seats in Sabah. 13 Since
then, the Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan)-PH
pact formed the state government after a BN
component party United Pasok Momogun
Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO)
defected, an episode equally dramatic as the
formation of Bersatu.14 In Sarawak, BN won only
60% of federal seats. These trends are selfexplanatory given that, traditionally, East
Malaysia has been referred to as a “fixed deposit”
for BN. Considering that, collectively, Sabah,
Sarawak, and the Federal Territory of Labuan
account for 57 federal seats, or nearly 26% of the
federal legislative, East Malaysian votes have
historically been particularly important for BN’s
efforts to retain the federal government. Based
on this, observers of Malaysian politics predicted
that, while PH would likely perform well in
Peninsular Malaysia—perhaps even better than
in GE13—it would make dismal inroads into
East Malaysia, even if it had secured an electoral
pact with the Parti Warisan Sabah. 15 This
renders BN’s poor performance in East Malaysia
particularly significant to note. To understand
how this came to be, the interplay between local
and national politics needs to be interrogated.
In the immediate aftermath of GE14, talk of
defections within BN Sabah was rife. Parti
Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS) quit the coalition,

G.K. Brown & R. Lim (2013), “Report 5: General Election
2013: Sabah,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th General Election in
Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and Implications,” IDE-JETRO.
12 Khoo Boo Teik (2013), “Report 1: 13th General Election
in Malaysia: Overview and Summary,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th
General Election in Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and
Implications,” IDE-JETRO.
13 Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (2018), “Statistik
Keseluruhan Bagi Parlimen PRU14,” ibid. (2018) “Statistik
Keseluruhan Bagi DUN PRU14.”
14 A. Azhar (2018), “Six switch sides, Warisan has majority
with 35 seats,” Malaysiakini, May 11.
11

and both UPKO and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) defected to the Warisan-Pakatan
alliance. 16 The sudden fluidity of political
alliances pointed out already existing structural
fissures within BN Sabah, which were probably
hitherto placated by relatively large election
wins. Most likely, the waning support for BN in
GE13—nearly a third of wins were marginal—
led to internal frustration within the coalition
over electoral strategies and envisioned goals.17
Such frustrations were accentuated by the
departure of Shafie Apdal from BN, a former
UMNO Vice-President and former Minister,
who in 2015 quit Najib’s administration to found
Warisan and enter into an electoral pact with
PH. Apdal’s decision rattled BN Sabah, just as
Mahathir’s defection rattled UMNO in
Peninsular Malaysia. In light of this, Warisan
made Shafie central to its election campaign by
highlighting him as the champion the Sabahans’
rights, while juxtaposing him against Musa
Aman, whom many accused of complicity with
the federal government for disregarding
pertinent issues concerning Sabah.18
A Veritable Malaysian Tsunami
Another important factor which caused BN’s
poor performance at the federal level fared was
its failure to engage what emerged as the voters’
most important consideration during this
election: the rising cost of living and inflation,
manifestations of which are the GST and the
government’s corruption scandals. For example,
Serina Abdul Rahman remarked that many of the
rural Malay voters in Johor declared their switch
of allegiance from UMNO to PH as temporary:
while still UMNO supporters at heart, many
individuals cast against Najib and the GST. 19
A. Puyok & P. Waikar (2018), “Why it is unlikely that
Sabah will swing to the opposition,” Today, May 8.
16 Malaysiakini (2018), “PBRS is third party to leave Sabah
BN,” May 12.
17 G.K. Brown & R. Lim (2013), “Report 5: General Election
2013: Sabah,” in K.B. Teik ed., 13th General Election in
Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and Implications,” IDE-JETRO.
18 Borneo Today (2018), “Musa Aman has failed Sabahans,
Sabah remains poorest state – Jeffrey Kitingan,” April 19.
19 Presentation delivered by Serina Abdul Rahman during
the Asian Research Institute-S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (ARI-RSIS) roundtable “The 14th
15

24

Berita

25

______________________________________________________________________________

Contrary to voters’ sentiments, BN’s campaign
focused on their good track-record in state and
federal governance, the virtues of a stable
government, and the potential evil posed by the
opposition to Malay voters. Yet, BN’s
dissonance with the grievances of the larger
Malaysian public backfired across the country,
especially as the coalition misunderstood the
extent of public discontent. Inflation in Johor is
higher than the national average, and so
thousands of Malaysians commute daily to
Singapore in search of a better pay.20 Given the
low exchange rate between the Singaporean
dollar and Malaysian ringgit, many Johoreans
felt disgruntled with their financial situations. In
Penang, MCA’s strategy of capitalizing on
China’s One Belt One Road project in Malaysia
hardly attracted the voters’ attention. Instead,
voters were more concerned with bread-andbutter issues, such as GST and toll taxes, which
constituted the backbone of the Democratic
Action Party’s (DAP) campaigning. 21 The
Sabahan Warisan-Pakatan pact and PH Sarawak
also leveraged on the nationwide anger at the
GST and corruption issues in order to catalyze
big swings from BN, especially in Chinesemajority seats where voting patterns mirrored
the Peninsular. What is more, parties with a firm
regional outlook from both Sabah and Sarawak
were decimated at the polls, suggesting that East
Malaysian politics is evolving beyond
parochialism. Amidst these trends, five BN
candidates in Sarawak and nine BN candidates in
Sabah won with increased majorities. 22 These
contradictory patterns indicate that the appeal of
the individual candidate may matter more than
party politics in certain constituencies. What is

clear, though, is that BN can no longer afford
complacency and treat East Malaysia as a vote
bank.

General Election of Malaysia: A New Dawn for
Democracy?” June 4, 2018, Singapore.
20 “Disillusionment with BN grows as inflation goes up in
Johor”, TODAY, February 21, 2018.
21 Free Malaysia Today (2018), “Report: Forget the scandals,
GE14 will be about bread-and-butter issues,” February 13.
22 The Borneo Post (2018), “GE13 Results: Sarawak”;
ibid. (2018), “GE13 Results: Sabah (P)”; ibid. (2018) “GE13
Results: Sabah (State);” Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia
(2018), “Keputusan Terkini Parlimen Sarawak”; ibid. (2018)
“Keputusan Terkini Parlimen Sabah.”
Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, “Keputusan Terkini

Dewan Undangan Negeri Sabah.”
23 Kini TV (2018), “I will work together with my friends to
rebuild Malaysia,” April 29.
24 See: The Star Online (2018), “GLC chiefs show they can
do music in 'Hebat Negaraku' video,” March 23.
25 Business Insider (2018), “Tony Fernandes says he owes
AirAsia’s success as one of the biggest international brands
to Najib’s government”, May 7; Free Malaysia Today’s
Youtube account (2018), “Kejayaan kami kerana dasar
‘dahulukan rakyat’ pentadbiran Najib,” May 6,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_zQCA74OQs

BN’s campaign content had glitz and highquality production, but it ultimately failed to
connect with the people at an emotional level.
For example, it was unable to compete with PH’s
approach that better engaged voters. Campaign
content appeared sincerer on PH’s end.
Mahathir’s video to save the country, for
instance, was perceived as more sensitive to the
rakyat’s socioeconomic grievances.23 Conversely,
BN’s campaigns failed to address GST and cost
of living issues, which were key drivers of
GE14’s Malaysian tsunami. Instead, it hyped up
the economy by showing GLC bosses promoting
BN’s economic track record via the Hebat
Negaraku song24, along with videos of pro-GST
citizens and AirAsia CEO Tony Fernandes’
crediting his company’s success to the Najib
administration 25 —all of which gave the
impression that BN was indifferent to people’s
concerns and predicaments. These focuses on
past achievements are unappealing—if not
irrelevant— to the wired youth whose concerns
for the country are grounded in anxieties about
the future. In that case, PH gained momentum
amongst the youth and angry voters through its
manifesto and campaign strategies that reflect a
vehement spirit for reform. BN’s historic loss at
the hands of PH was a battle lost on various
fronts, including social media. Compared to
GE12 and GE13, BN’s social media machinery
established far savvier campaigns featuring viral
videos, influencers, trending slogans like
#Negarakru
and
#HebatkanNegaraku.
Nevertheless, this proved to be insufficient to
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heal its tarnished image and failed to convince
enough citizens to vote in its favor. As such,
social media has not only become an arena for
drawing more voters and image-building, but
also a powerful platform for exposing
wrongdoing and mobilization. Increased
transparency as made possible by the Internet
has made it easier for people to perform
background checks and become more involved in
civic issues. This sharpened people’s objectivity
and provided more space for dissents, leading to
further distrust in BN’s authority.
On the contrary, PH’s social media utilization
had a profound impact on the youth, influencing
scores who, despite being first-time voters in
GE14, decided to support the coalition based on
previous elections. Therefore, the voter
turnout—slightly lower at 82.32% compared to
84.84% in GE13—was dominated by voters aged
21-39 (41%).26 In addition, social media enabled
PH overcome its financial disadvantage vis-à-vis
BN and mobilize large crowds in their ad hoc
campaign rallies across the country. Meanwhile
in Kelantan and Terengganu, BN’s reluctance to
utilize large-scale ceramahs further disconnected
it from the rural voters. The victory of PAS in
both states in the absence of a significant social
media presence also adds to the presumption that
“personal touch” campaigning, such as ceramahs,
remains effective and relevant in retaining and
attracting voters. Given its 28-year experience
as the lead opposition party with the largest
membership in Malaysia, PAS managed to
navigate through different crowds and address
problems that are important to the locals, such
as the rising living cost caused by GST, disaster
management, and costly student loans
(PTPTN).

mass-scale swing of non-Malay support from the
component parties of BN—the Chinesedominant Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
(Gerakan), the Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA) and the Indian-based Malaysian Indian
Congress (MIC)—to the opposition. Most
significantly, MCA president Liow Tiong Lai,
Gerakan President Mah Siew Keong, and MIC
president S Subramaniam have lost in Bentong,
in Teluk Intan, and in Segamat, respectively, to
PH candidates. Only MCA deputy president,
Wee Kah Siong, barely survived in the Ayer
Hitam parliamentary constituency in Johor,
winning against DAP’s candidate, Liew Chin
Tong, with a margin of only 303 votes.27 MCA
has lost most seats that the party held after the
2013 elections, Gerakan lost Simpang Renggam
and Teluk Intan, while MIC only managed to
retain Cameron Highlands, a mixed seat with
34% of Malay, 32% Chinese and 21% of Indian
voters won with a margin of 597 votes to PH’s
DAP candidate. MIC faced the same issues as the
Chinese political parties, when it lost its
incumbent parliamentary seats of Tapah, Hulu
Selangor, and Segamat. In Segamat, Malay
voters are slightly lesser than Chinese voters,
44% to 46%, respectively, while the Indian
community represents around 10%.

GE14 results showed that, contrary to the
pundits’ expectations, changed occurred not due
to a Malay tsunami, but due to a Malaysian
tsunami. This was particularly evident in the

In Johor, aside from the Ayer Hitam seat,
component parties in BN have once again been
found wanting. MCA and MIC suffered crushing
defeats particularly in Johor, as voters
abandoned these parties en masse. Their
consistent failure to address national issues, such
as inflation and corruption, caused more Chinese
support to drift towards the opposition28. Poor
candidates and misguided election campaigns
that centered on small local problems
compounded defeat for a party struggling for
legitimacy from its core base. The future of MIC,
Gerakan, and MCA remains unknown, as the
existence of BN as a coalition is hardly seen after
the GE14. UMNO itself is experiencing a critical

The Straits Times (2018), “Malaysia's Election
Commission: Voter turnout at 82.32%, higher than initial
76%,” May 11.
27 Suruhan Pilihanraya Malaysia (2018), “SEMAKAN

KEPUTUSAN PILIHAN RAYA UMUM KE – 14,” May 5.
28 R. Ali (2018), “Commentary: To win over Johor voters,
politicians compete to represent the Johor identity,” Channel
News Asia, May 8.
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period of transition and fractioning and it is
uncertain that after the Malay dominant political
party regrouped, it will be willing to work with
MCA, Gerakan and MIC as a multi-racial
coalition again, considering the light weight of
seats MCA and MIC have in federal.
Nevertheless, the components need to first
reflect on their mistakes regarding the failure to
keep a check and balance within a coalition and
standing up against an unequal alliance. Despite
the positive outlook for the opposition coming
into the election, the extent of BN’s defeat is
frankly astounding. This indicates that a ‘Malay
tsunami’ may not be as accurate as a ‘Malaysian
tsunami,’ as evidenced by the wholesale
abandonment of MCA and MIC. Nevertheless,
the presence of Bersatu must be credited with
turning key seats such as Muar, and Simpang
Renggam to the opposition on the back of Malay
support. They presented a viable alternative to
many Malay voters which made the switching of
allegiances an easier task.
The Implicit Persistence of Racialized
Political Agendas
In a move hailed as the end of racialized political
agendas, neither BN, PH, nor PAS made race
and religion the focus of their manifestos. This
trend was captured by numerous polls and
surveys ahead of the election which sought to
measure the sentiments of the electorate.
Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research revealed
in December 2017 that, irrespective of race and
religion, voters’ main considerations for the next
election would be inflation (68%), corruption
(36%) and job opportunities (19%). The
preservation of Malay privilege, while still an
issue, remained low in the list of priorities, along
with political instability and the weakness of the
leadership. The prospect of success for the
opposition looks equally grim. The poll revealed
that only 21% of the total respondents appeared
satisfied with the opposition, and only 13% of the
interviewed Malay felt the same. Overall the
Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research
29S.

Amarthalingam (2018), “Pakatan makes best showing
in Penang, winning 37 out of 40 seats,” The Edge Markets,
May 10.

highlighted the growing dissatisfaction of
Malaysians with the overall political system.
Indeed, GE14 results demonstrate the veracity
of these predictions. Yet, these do not disqualify
the persistent relevance of race and religion in
shaping the electorate’s preferences. Much like
gender dynamics, while race and religion were
not openly acknowledged, they emerged as
underlying threads in GE14, informing both the
fielding and election of candidates.
Uniquely, for the Indian community the MIC
was no longer viewed as the representative of the
community. In areas with a strong Indian
presence such as Batu Kawan, Nibong Tebal, and
Padang Serai, the PH won these seats by
whooping majorities. 29 This trend points out
that the Indian community ceased to vote
according to ethnic considerations, suggesting
that the MIC failed to adequately respond to the
community’s problems. Instead, Indians chose to
vote for Pakatan Harapan, although the coalition
did not include an Indian-dominant party. Just
like MCA, the MIC’s failures to address key
federal issues such as corruption and patronism
contributed to its perception of an UMNOsubservient outfit.30
Unlike Indians, Malaysian Chinese remained
consistent in their historical voting patterns,
wherein the party was the key consideration.
This is reflected in the GE14 results, as the DAP
won its 42 parliamentary seats, out of the total
47 contested, in Chinese-majority constituencies. 31 In Penang, even as the state
government faced severe corruption allegations,
such as the trial of Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng
over the undersea tunnel and illegal land sales,
DAP had won all the 7 parliamentary seats and
defended all of the 19 state seats contested.
While DAP focused on the cost of living, a key
concern for the Chinese community, ethnicbased parties remain important for the Chinese
community as can be seen in the strong presence
of the party in Melaka and Negeri Sembilan.
K. Haridas (2017), “The numbers tell a story,” The
Malaysia Insight, December 28.
31 Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia (2018).
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Similar to the Chinese community, in the Malaymajority states of Kelantan, Terengganu,
Pahang, Kedah, and Perlis ethnicity and religion
remained the key issues informing the
electorate’s political choice. Ahead of the
elections pundits confidently declared the
strength of PAS on the decline, especially given
the party’s split from Pakatan Harapan.32
The Green Belt in Northern Malaysia
Yet, as predicted by few, the results in Kelantan,
Terengganu, Pahang and Kedah signal quite the
opposite: PAS’ political clout expanded
considerably from the last election. 33 PAS
managed to remain in control of Kelantan, its
historical abode, by successfully reclaiming the
five state seats lost to Barisan Nasional in GE13
and maintaining its grip of nine parliamentary
seats. Its strategy focused on trumpeting its
mission as ensuring the survival of the final
bastion of Islam in the country. The issue of
development came out strongly as a BN’s main
campaigning strategy in Kelantan. BN banked
on the lack of infrastructure and development in
Kelantan, Malaysia’s poorest state, and promised
to build a new stadium, a bridge in the Keterah
constituency and a university. Yet, to their
surprise, Kelantanese citizens care less about
development, a point emphasized by Takyiuddin
Hassan during an interview in Kota Bharu. 34
PAS responded to BN’s campaign by stepping up
their religious rhetoric, declaring an electoral
jihad to defend the state, a strategy which
resonated better with the Kelantanese than BN’s
focus on development. PAS also won
Terengganu with a clear majority, 18 seats, and
gained two extra parliamentary seats, currently
holding six seats. Unlike Kelantan, neither Islam
nor religion featured prominently in the
manifestos of either UMNO or PAS. In fact, the
party’s local leadership revamped itself as
technocratic, offering a comprehensive, rather

T.H. Yee (2018), “Malaysia Election: Pollster Merdeka
Center expects BN to win poll, but not popular vote,” The
Straits Times, May 8; R. Augustin, “Invoke predicts 5 states
to PH, PAS to lose everything,“ Free Malaysia Today (2018),
March 10.
32

populist manifesto to address the discontent of
Terengganu citizens over the rising cost of
living and the introduction of the GST. Yet,
given that PAS and UMNO remained the sole
players in the state, also to the detriment of the
Amanah party, an allegedly moderate split of
PAS, it is obvious religion and ethnicity remain
quintessential in shaping voters’ political
preferences. PAS also made unprecedented
inroads into Kedah and Pahang, securing 15
state seats and 8 state seats respectively. PAS’
success is especially relevant if understood in the
wider federal context. While the bread-andbutter issue, a grievance crossing ethnic,
religious and class divides, was best vocalized by
the opposition, a significant number of fencesitters and disgruntled UMNO supporters in
Kedah and Pahang chose PAS over PH. It
appeared that, in this three-cornered fight,
religion was the key factor, rather than the cost
of living.
Conclusion
GE14 has allegedly shaken Southeast Asian
politics with an unprecedented democratic
tsunami. The results highlighted how
Malaysians mobilized across various sociopolitical and economic categories to hold the BN
government accountable for its widespread
corrupt behavior and insensible economic
policies. The overly optimistic accounts of the
election have been tempered by concerns over
potential ripples of Mahathir’s autocratic legacy,
as well as further political patronage. Racialized
political agendas also remain a big question mark
clouding this electoral triumph, as PH has often
been accused for couching racial politics into a
rhetoric of multiculturalism. Yet, in spite of all
this, GE14 sent a clear message to electorates
across the region: whether a vote for PH, against
BN or against Najib, where there is a will, there
is a way.

M. Nawab M. Osman (2018), “Commentary: As battle for
Malay voters heats up don’t expect PAS to go quietly into
the night,” Channel News Asia, May 4.
34 Interview with Takiyuddin Hassan, Kota Bharu, May 4,
2018.
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Project Report
Project M:
Campaigning with a “Dictator”
Sophie Lemière
Birth of a Project
In March 2017, I met Mahathir Mohamad in his
office at the Perdana Foundation in Putrajaya. I
had interviewed him almost every year since
2012, and since the creation of his new party
“Bersatu” in 2016, we have had several informal
occasions to talk during fund raising dinners and
other similar events. On that day, I wanted to
share my idea of a new research project that
would involve following him extensively. His
assistant had squeezed me into a tight schedule
for what I had described as “just a project pitch.”
Mahathir was seated behind his very large desk
in a very large office. As I entered the room, he
nodded. No handshake or any form of familiarity,
as some other politicians would allow themselves
after many years of interactions. I learned the
man is cold until he is not, but also that the ice
may freeze again at any moment.
In a jump-start, I ask, “I would like to follow you
during your campaign, if you allow me to.” He
smiles, “Well, we don’t know when elections will
be. And I’m not a candidate!” I answer in a jovial
yet confident tone, “I believe you will be.” In a
slow pace emphasizing every single word, he
says, “I am just here to contribute, not to be
Prime Minister.” I slightly pull my shoulders
straight to the back of the chair, perhaps to add
a dramatic note and state, “You are not a
contributor, Sir, you are a leader.“ He smiles
again, and as a conclusion to a discussion turned
into negotiation, he adds, “I never say no to a
reporter”. I managed to quiet the huge “oh là là”
that crossed my mind.
Slightly offended, to say the least, in my French
pride, my female pride, or my academic pride (or
all of the above) I was, for a very short moment,
unsure of how to position myself. Mahathir has

never been friendly to journalists and I could not
start this project on such a perception. I
wondered in my mind, “Is he not just playing,
again?” I took a breath and started —without
really knowing where I would land— “Well, Sir,
if you don’t mind, I have studied for 12 years and
suffered 7 years doing a PhD so, please, do not
call me a reporter. I am a Doctor, like you. I’m
Dr. Sophie, you are Dr. Mahathir.“ He looked
both surprised and amused: “True… you don’t
call me ‘Tun’ like others do. Is that (the reason)
why?”
A month later, the Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs at Harvard University
offered me a fantastic fellowship for this project.
In July, I went back to Malaysia. I was very
proud to announce to Mahathir Harvard
University’s interest in the project. I said, “the
Americans are interested, you see”—I should
confess, as a French person, the very unsubtle
objectification of “the Americans” has always
been an easy tactic to gain the interest of
Malaysian politicians. Answering my effort to
reassert my neutrality—despite an Americanfunded project—he sarcastically says: “You can
do whatever you want; I won’t try to influence
you. You can even call me a dictator, like others
do, I don’t mind.”
At this moment, we reached one of the key ideas
of the project. Although far from the ruler
portrayed in Sacha Byron Cohen’s movie (The
Dictator, 2012), Mahathir’s image had long been
one of a dictator, if not an authoritarian leader.
This is an image he always said he was
indifferent to. Ironically, “dictator” is among the
expressions he has repeatedly used during his
campaign since resigning from UMNO; often he
tries to feint indifference by making jokes over
the fact that he is the “only dictator who
resigned.”
It now seems like Mahathir’s magic has
operated. His former heir and arch-enemy,
Anwar Ibrahim, recently said on the BBC he is
no longer “the Trump of his days.” This
incredible change reminds us of Chaplin’s
fantastic scene in “the Great Dictator” (1940)
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where a Jewish barber takes the place of the antiSemitic, ethnonationalist dictator of “Tomania”
and declares in a passionate speech to his army a
new path for the world, a path to universality,
equality, and justice. Somewhere between
redemption and denial, pragmatism and
opportunism, Mahathir is re-writing history:
after all, what kind of dictator—if not a barber—
becomes a symbol of democracy?
The Last Game: Gambling with Mahathir
“The Last Game: Malaysian Politics in the Eye
of Mahathir Campaign” is a research project I
conducted during five months in Malaysia, from
the General Assembly of his party Bersatu on
December 30th, to his first speech to the Prime
Minister Office’s staff on May 23rd.
As explained, Mahathir had agreed to the project
in 2017, but I had to be renegotiate my access
from time to time. This trip was not first
encounter with Mahathir, or his circle, but I
surely had never before been as close to him. For
the past 20 years or more, only a very protective
and very tight circle of loyal administrators and
assistants surrounded the former Prime
Minister. A few times, more than I wished for, I
found myself being the collateral damage of
inner rivalries. Yet my previous experience
pushing at and literally running after gang’s
leaders during my PhD days had taught me a few
tricks to step into exclusive community of power,
and helped me to stay in the good books of most.
The data collected during these five months
includes extensive observations, regular
discussions with Mahathir and his old guards,
interviews with Bersatu leaders and also
politicians from other parties, Bersatu regular
members and part of the political machinery,
UMNO supporters and leaders, gang leaders
who switched allegiances from UMNO to PH,
and business men labelled as “cronies, former
UMNO cyber-troopers…” The amount of
information I gathered is tremendous, and I am
still just on the edge of figuring out how to
explore the many questions I have in mind. I am
currently trying to organize thoughts, ideas, and
data far from the adrenaline of the campaign—at

this point suggestions from fellow Malaysianists
or comparatist ethnographers are very welcome!
In a first stage, I will use part of the material to
update my book manuscript, based on a revision
of my PhD dissertation on gangs and politics in
Malaysia (anticipated submission in August).
During the campaign, I met with many gang
leaders and members I knew then and new ones,
whom all have switched allegiances to Mahathir.
The second phase of my work is the writing of
this new manuscript with the support of the
Stanford-NUS Lee Kong Chiang Fellowship and
Harvard’s Ash Center for Democracy. “The Last
Game” is deeply rooted in empirical material as
described and revolving around the persona of
Mahathir: his relationship to politics in general,
to the public, and also to his close collaborators.
On another level, this project implies the need to
reflect on spending so much time with a leader,
and the evolution of my own perception of him
brings some interesting aspects. My intention is
not to make this (perception) a central object of
study, but rather to contribute to questions
related to this type of unique experience and as
an indication of how the political charms of a
leader may operate. Several questions can be
addressed and challenged, if not answered,
through a thorough analysis of this empirical
material to highlight the underpinning
structures of the Malaysian political scene.
The project was, like Mahathir’s decision, a
gamble. If he had not won the election, his entire
legacy would have fallen through the cracks of
history—so would have my ambitious project. In
fact, not many had bet on the old man’s leap of
faith. However, against all odds, UMNO
collapsed on the eve of its 72nd anniversary.
Mahathir’s overwhelming victory slayed 61
years of an ethnonationalist political monopoly:
an historic transition for Malaysia from semiauthoritarian rule to electoral democracy. No
book can ever perfectly reflect the spontaneity,
contradiction, and even irrationality of historical
events that once put in perspective “make sense.”
Just another leap of (academic) faith.
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Book Review
Planting Empire, Cultivating Subjects:
British Malaya, 1768-1941

(Lynn Hollen Lees, Cambridge University
Press, 2017)
Craig A. Lockard, University of WisconsinGreen Bay
Historians of Malaysia, of Southeast Asia, and of
the British Empire, as well as informed readers
in Malaysia, may find this innovative new book
by Lynn Hollen Lees of great interest. I had the
pleasure of reading and commenting on early
drafts of the manuscript. Hence, this is not a
review as such, since I am not an unbiased
observer, but I would like to highlight for
prospective readers some of the book’s strengths
and insights.
Planting Empire is a fine, well-written, and
deeply researched work that explores the
transnational movements and colonial policies
that shaped British Malaya and its peoples. Lees
explores how British governance permitted,
even fostered, cross-cultural exchanges and
learning between the diverse inhabitants,
especially on plantations and in towns in the
more economically developing areas (mainly the
west coast). But colonial rule also led to racial
privilege and rigid ethnic differences.

views culturally hybrid groups (such as
Western-educated Chinese) as among the major
social/ bicultural brokers in the local colonial
order.
In her view, British rule constructed some
bridges, albeit narrow and creaky ones, over
communal differences. But while it was
established and maintained in an authoritarian
form on plantations, she argues, it was
transformed and weakened in the towns. Empire
brought with it both oppression and economic
opportunity. The modernist middle class became
larger over time, while many working class
subjects experienced Malayan life as repression,
limited options, and employment with long
hours and short wages. But by the 1930s most
(although certainly not all) Malayans had made
peace with the hierarchical colonial system and
knew how to deal with it. In her conclusion Lees
lays out her thoughts on what this case study
tells us about the formation, roles, and realities
of empire. Colonialism, she argues, was in many
ways a collaborative enterprise that benefitted
the rulers and also the sizeable group among the
ruled who profited from it. There is much here
for historians and their students to discuss and
debate.

Based on a wide range of primary and secondary
sources, including administrative files, court
transcripts, periodicals, oral interviews, and
material culture, the social history components
of her study are very strong. A good use of
quotes and chapter introductory vignettes
contribute to an engaging read. Throughout, the
author sketches ordinary people and their lives
on plantations and in towns, as well as the
geographical layouts, that really enliven the
narrative. She also presents excellent discussions
of topics like Chinese and Indian immigration,
the development and social structure of towns
and plantations, and the role of schools,
newspapers, and voluntary associations. She
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Call for Panelists and Book
Chapters
Revisioning 2020 (MSB Group Project)
The Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Group intends
to sponsor a two-part panel at the AAS annual
meeting to be held in Boston in March of 2020
called “REVISIONING 2020” and publish an
edited volume of the same name. Our objective is
to rethink and revisit Mahathir's "Vision 2020"
and the Malaysia that has emerged since he
coined the slogan (and the uniquely Mahathirstyle “vision” of a perfect future it anticipated). It
is our hope that the sessions will produce papers
that can appear as chapters in an edited volume
of the same name.
Vision 2020 was set out in 1991 by Prime
Minister Mahathir as a plan that would advance
Malaysia to the status of a “fully developed
country” by the year 2020. Mahathir proclaimed
that “by the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united
nation, with a confident Malaysian society,
infused by strong moral and ethical values, living
in a society that is democratic, liberal and
tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable,
progressive and prosperous, and in full
possession of an economy that is competitive,
dynamic, robust, and resilient.” Vision 2020 was
intended to provide direction to Malaysia’s
national development project that had begun
with NEP, extended into NDP, and position
Malaysia as an Asian and global leader.
Mahathir envisioned a transformation of
Malaysia’s people and its landscape: Vision 2020
would create a “caring” and “selfless” citizenry
ready and responsible for the challenges of the
nation’s future; its futuristic exhortations asked
Malaysians to advance as citizens of a global
cybersociety, as world-class leaders in
technology, education, and science.
But that future and Mahathir’s vision of its
perfection was still remote in 1991, and
Malaysians needed to change and transform
themselves in order to reach it. Mahathir set out
nine “central strategic challenges” that would be

overcome in thirty years when Malaysia would
be (1) a united nation, “Bangsa Malaysia”; (2) a
nation “subservient to none”; (3) a mature,
“consensual, community-oriented Malaysian
democracy”; (4) a fully moral and ethical society
with religious and spiritual values; (5) a liberal
and tolerant society in which “Malaysians of all
colours and creeds are free to practice and
profess their customs, cultural and religious
beliefs”; (6) a world-class scientific and
progressive society; (7) a fully “caring society”
and “caring culture” where the welfare of the
people is not dependent on the “state but on the
family”; (8) an economically just society with a
“fair and equitable distribution of wealth in the
nation” where “race was not identified with
economic function”; (9) a prosperous society
(Mahathir’s speech Wawasan 2020, Majlis
Perdagangan Malaysia di Kuala Lumpur,
February 28, 1991). Pointing out that it was
likely that in the year 2020 neither he nor many
of the Malaysians alive in 1991 would “be (t)here
to enjoy it,” Vision 2020 strongly reflected the
theme of “selflessness”—that Malaysians would
always put needs of the nation before their own
and strive towards a perfect future for the good
of others. The fact that Mahathir is once again
Prime Minister as 2020 approaches is just one of
the many ironies that can be read into his 1991
plan and his “vision.”
We urge submissions from all disciplines
(History, Political Science, Economics, Political
Economy, Gender and Sexuality Studies,
Development Studies, Anthropology, Sociology,
Urban Planning, Geography, Education, etc.),
from both “old hands” in Malaysia (people who
have been “on the ground” in the years since
Mahathir's announcement) and people who
envision a Malaysia one, two, or more decades on
from 2020 . . . in other words, everyone with a
keen awareness of Malaysia, its problems, its
challenges, and its politics.
The list of possible topics for papers and book
chapters is vast, and we encourage Malaysianists
to also imagine focusing on topics that reach far
beyond what Mahathir himself might have
envisioned when he thought about 2020 in
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1991—such as Malaysia and the rise of ISIS;
Malaysia in the eyes of China; Malaysia and
global graft; the return of Mahathir and Anwar;
the rise and the role of shariah and its
bureaucracy; and many others.
We invite abstracts (max. 300 words) from
scholars at any stage of their career. Please send
your abstract along with your affiliation details
and a short CV. We will be accepting potential
panelists and book chapters on a rolling basis
starting in August 2018. Feel free to contact us
with any ideas or thoughts about this project.
Patricia Sloane-White, MSB Chair
pswhite@udel.edu
Cheong Soon Gan, MSB Deputy Chair
cgan@uwsuper.edu

Call for Book Chapters
Malaysian Politics and People: Volume 3
Established in 2014, Malaysian Politics and People
is a unique series of studies on Malaysian politics
and society edited by Sophie Lemière. The first
volume, Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics
and People, was released in 2014 in the aftermath
of GE13, and the second volume, Illusions of
Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People Volume II
appeared in 2017 in the lead-up to GE14. The
series aims to make an important contribution to
the study of Malaysian politics and society and
to speak not only to researchers and scholars of
Malaysia but also to activists, students,
journalists, policy makers, and others interested
in understanding their wider dynamics. Each
volume brings together academics from around
the world as well as the work of Malaysian
cartoonist Zunar, who offers his own visual
interpretation of each topic explored in the
volume.
The series has played a key role in drawing wider
attention to Malaysian studies and placing a
focus on emerging scholars and new areas of
study. The first edition was a success, selling out
its first and second prints. The second volume

will shortly be published internationally by
Amsterdam University Press.
As Malaysia is entering a period of political
change we are now looking ahead to the third
volume to begin to analyze what makes up this
“new” Malaysia. We are looking for contributions offering original perspectives on
contemporary affairs and tracing the evolution of
political, social, and economic dynamics. We are
particularly interested in research focusing on
overlooked areas of Malaysian politics and
society, emphasizing inter-disciplinarity, and
ethnographic and fieldwork-based research.
We would be glad to receive propositions
exploring—but not limited to—the following
areas:
• Reform in all of its manifestations:
institutional,
governance,
judicial,
education, economic, health, agriculture
and land, etc.
• Malaysia and theories of democratic
transition
• Malaysia-China relations
• The impact of GE14 on the wider region
• Malaysia’s new political dynamics:
beyond race and religion?
• An ethnography of political parties and
political campaigning
• Political and social challenges in
general, and challenges to Malay
culture, Malay institutions Malay
language in particular
• Art and Politics
• Elections:
Electoral
manipulation,
historical perspectives on elections and
campaigning
• The place of minority groups in
Malaysia: Women, Malaysian Indians,
Indigenous communities and LGBTQI
people
• Environmental/resources issues
Submission Procedure:
Please send the following items to editor Sophie
Lemière at sophie.lemiere@gmail.com by July
30, 2018:

33

Berita

34

______________________________________________________________________________

— an abstract of no more than 400 words
— a short bio of no more than 300 words
— an updated CV with current affiliation and
publications.
Final selections will be made by mid to late
August 2018. Once accepted the final deadline
for paper submissions will be November 30,
2018, with publication of the volume scheduled
for Fall 2019.
Papers should be submitted exclusively in the
following format:
• No more than 6,000 words
• Avoiding academic jargon yet showing
awareness of contemporary and classic
academic literature
• Solidly grounded in recent empirical
research
• In Microsoft Word format (.doc or .docx)
• Using British spelling and punctuation
• In font Times New Roman size 12, without
any formatting
• Using Harvard Referencing Style

researchers from around the world, to work on
an important piece of Asia-related research.
Applicants should only apply for ONE of the
four types of position (Senior Research Fellow,
Research Fellow, Postdoctoral Fellow, Visiting
Senior Research Fellow). Closing date is
September
3,
2018.
Further
details:
https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Page/ARIJobOpportunities2018-19

Call for Papers
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs

JCSSA is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic
journal published by the GIGA Institute of
Asian Studies, Hamburg. Aside from the print
edition, JCSAA is also be available online as an
open access journal. It presents key research and
professional analyses on current political,
economic, and social affairs in Southeast Asia,
with listings in major indexes. It invites
submissions for research articles, book reviews
and special issue proposals. For further details
see www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org

The editor, Sophie Lemière, is a postdoctoral
fellow at Harvard University where she received
the 2017-18 Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs (WCFIA) Scholars
Program fellowship. She recently obtained the
Stanford-NUS Distinguished Lee Kong Chiang
Fellowship for 2018-19, and a non-residential
fellowship at the Ash Center for Democracy in
Harvard. She will be visiting Stanford in the Fall
2018 and NUS in the Spring 2019. In 2013, she
started the series “Malaysian Politics and
People” published/distributed by Gerakbudaya
Malaysia in Southeast Asia, and University of
Amsterdam Press and University of Chicago
Press in Europe and North America.

Job Opportunities
NUS: Job Opportunities

The Asia Research Institute, National
University of Singapore, is offering various
fixed-term positions for outstanding, active
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Member Notes
Patricia Hardwick

New Project: “Malay Chronicles, Thai Drama,
Javanese Tales: Indonesian Malay Identity,
Pasisir Cultural Flows and the Performing Arts
in Riau Islands Province”. Senior Scholar
Research Fulbright grant (September 2018 –
August 2020), Hofstra University, in
cooperation with Universitas Indonesia (UI).
Her project will contextualize the role of
contemporary cultural flows that continue to
shape Indonesian Malay theatrical traditions and
expressions of Indonesian Malay Identity in
Riau Islands Province. It will also investigate the
historical and cultural flows between the Riau
Islands, West Java, Central Java, the Northeast
Coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and Southern
Thailand to explore the exchange of ideas,
performers, and performance practices in this
region. In an era in which ownership of
intangible cultural heritage is often contested in
the culturally interconnected world of maritime
Southeast Asia, an examination of the historical
and contemporary influence of pasisir cultural
flows on performance forms like Riau mak
yong will provide new perspectives on the ways
in which people and performing arts circulated
in the region in the period before colonial rule
and the emergence of modern nation-states.

Kerstin Steiner has also commented on the
Malaysian 1MDB scandal with, including for
BBC Newsday following the arrest of former
Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak.
The interview is available
at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w172w
1fkx8wcjg8

Editorial Information
BERITA is the official publication of the
Malaysian/Singapore/Brunei (MSB) Studies
Group. A part of the Association of Asian
Studies, we are a cross-disciplinary network of
scholars, students, and observers with research
and other professional interests in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Brunei.
Editor:
Dominik M. Müller
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
muellerdo@eth.mpg.de

Kerstin Steiner

In late 2017, Kerstin Steiner was awarded La
Trobe University Law School’s Research
Excellence Award (Mid-Career), the Research
Excellence Award (Mid-Career) of La Trobe's
Arts, Social Sciences and Commerce (ASSC)
College, and the Research Excellence Award
(Mid-Career) by the university’s Deputy Vice
Chancellor. In early 2018, she also received a
distinguished scholar award by the Philippine
International Studies Organization (PHISO) for
her research in the field of international
relations.
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